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§ 2. Reasons for non-adoption in the several cases.
I. First as to the case of a Monarch superadded to a Legislative
Assembly composed of members elected or supposed or pretended to be elected by
the great body of the people.
This case already been considered: namely, under the
question— Why bring into action the great body of the people in
the character of sharers in the supreme Constitutive power. A
government in which the whole or any part of the supreme
legislative or supreme executive power is in the hands of a single
person has thus been shown to be altogether incompatible
with good government: to be in a state of direct repugnance to
the greatest happiness principle:— inconsistent with the pursuit
of the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the
character of the end of government.
A Monarch, be his share of power ever so great or ever so small,
is a person whose interest is in a state of perpetual and irreconcileable
hostility to the universal interest of the members of
the community in which he is Monarch: a person having
a particular and sinister interest of his own, to which the
interest of the greater number is to a vast extent made
a continual sacrifice.
II. Next as to the case of an Aristocracy— whether
without a Monarch, or acting in subordination to and in
conjuction with a Monarch.
Of this institution likewise it has been shown, that
it is not only superfluous but positively mischievous—
no less plainly repugnant to the happiness and best
interest of the greater number than that of Monarchy is.
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j whatman turkey mill 1829 |
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jonathan blenman |
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