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28 Aug. 1804
Evidence
Whether one psychological fact can be evidentiary of another? Examples
I. Fear, (i.e. Pain of apprehension) of consciousness
1. Confusion of mind of criminative consciousness? Answer confusion of mind is fear
(i.e. pain of apprehension) which may be have have for its source the consciousness of the man suspected, or any
other source of danger.
II. Motive, of Intention.
2. Motive, if intentionally? Yes Not immediately, but subject exposure to the action of such
or such a motive: but that is physical evidence.
III. Intention, of Motive.
3. Intentionality, of motive? Yes, in same manner as above.
IV. Disposition, of Intention
4. Habitual enmity, love venereal sexual desire &c i.e. habitual disposition to
experience pains & pleasures of do. – circumstantial evidences of intentionality:
viz: intention to do the acts tending to the gratification of
the above propensities.
V. Falshood or Reticence, of Fear
5. False Non-responsive, False responsive &c. The psychological fact of
which they are immediately evidentiary, is fear: fear of some evil to
result from the disclosure. But this fear may have had other causes than the consciousness of
particular guilt in question.
V. Consciousness, of the past agency in question. Fallacs by confusion insanity produced by religion.
6. Self criminative consciousness i.e. supposed meaning of the act is not absolutely conclusive evidence
of the act. Instance cases of religious insanity.
7. So in theft, consciousness i.e. belief of want of title may
be erroneous. A man may shed his own goods believing them to
be anothers.
At each link in the chain of causality, the indication is liable to
be fallacious. Therefore the probative force will be less and less
as the number encreases.
In the indication of probative force Of the reversal species of circumstantial evidence there
can be little or nothing new. The evidentiary property quality of the
evidentiary fact would not exist, if the existence of it were not generally obvious.
What the legislator can do in the way of instruction for the Judge is little more than the
bringing the whole mass of doctrine together, for the purpose of affording
him to him at the commencement of his career that comprehensive view – of the subject – that sense of intellectual power
which is so useful to the right discharge of his functions, and
which otherwise might not be allowed for some time be wanting deficient.
Taking any one of these pairs of facts by itself, the probative forces
will be apt to strike the reader at first sight as being incompleat.
Accordingly it is seldom without a concurrence of several articles of
circumstantial evidence that the defence will present itself as strong enough to be conclusive.
Identifier: | JB/047/051/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 47.
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