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1
Judicial proceedings
to be public
except &c. p.1
2
Districts ought to
be small. p.1
3
Parishes the lowest
4
Occasional attendance
can not be inconvenient
where habitual
attendance for
worship is not. p.1
5
Expence the sole
limit to the multiplication. p.1
6
To each district but
one Judge – if
two, better two districts. p.1
7
Inconveniences of
more Judges than
one. p.2
1. Encrease of expence
2. Encrease of delay
3. Diminution of responsibility
4. – of dependance on public opinion
5 – of obligation to attend
6 – of the restraint on corrupt non-attendance.
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7
1. What additional
intelligence may be
afforded by multiplication
of Judges
is not as the number. p.2
8
2. It is in most
cases needless. p.2
9
3. Where wanted it
may be had at a
cheaper by appeal.
p.2.
10
All that can be
expected from multiplicity
of Judges
is secured by publicity
of proceeding. p.2.
11
Multiplicity of Judges
contributes to probity
no otherwise than
by contributing to
publicity. p.2.
12
Universal competence
– Reasons p.3.
Special jurisdiction
would require either
1. a special Court
& thence additional
expence &c and
2. Uncertainty by
conflict of jurisdiction
– or
2. Remoter justice.
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13
Uncertainty &
confusion the result
of metaphysical
boundary-lines. p.3
14
The abundance
of such lines in
the European Constitutions
is owing
partly to abuse –
partly to local &
temporary reasons.
Not to any large
views of utility
are so much as
influence on
the subject.
It has its root
in feudal barbarism. p.4
15
Matchless purity
of Courts composed
of a single Judge.
p.4
16
Matchless corruption
of Courts consisting
of hundreds of Judges.
p.4.
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1
Inexpediency of
a plurality of
Judges-assorted.
p.1.
1. Frugality
2. Expedition
3. Rectitude of decision
2
1. On the score of
frugality. p.2
3.
2. Rectitude of
decision – which
depends on
1. Probity. p.3
4
But publicity
is necessary. p.4
5
2 Probity in as far as depends
on –
1st. Responsibility
i:e: sensibility exposure
to amenability public opinion. p.5
A single Judge can
not escape the
2. He leads the whole of it.
6
2. Responsibility
in as far as it
is weakened by
a counter support
& counterpoise
to public opinion. p.5
3. A single Judge
has to confederate
to support counterpoise him under it.
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7
3. Responsibility
by weakening the
confidence of public
opinion in itself
& thence the force
with which it exerts
itself. p.6
4. A single Judge
has no confederate to
help him to overbear
public opinion. p.7
8
4. Responsibility
by affording a sure
mode of doing the
work of corruption
by halves: i:e: by
non-attendance. p.7
5. A single Judge
can not keep out
of the way unasked,
& so avoids thus
gives half a vote giving his vote
to the bad side worst
cause.
1. Reverts the force
of public opinion.
2. Enables a man to
escape the censure
of public opinion
1. by absentation
2. by his share in
the guilt being
unknown
3. Rare is a power
to lessen the smart
& the censure
of public opinion
by conspiring in
adversity.
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9
II. Industry &
Exertion. p.11
6. A sole Judge
has no resource
but in his own
powers.
He can not spare
exertion but at
the expence of
reputation.
H. of Commons
& Lords.
10
III. Intelligence
1. It is unfavourable
to intelligence
in each
in as far as intelligence
depends
on industry. p.11
2. The chance f quantity
of intelligence is
not as the number
– since either
12
1. One overbears
the rest & turns
them into cyphers. p.13
or
13
2. They split
into parties so it
is worse. p.13
11
3. Extraordinary
intelligence is not
wanted in the
great majority
or ranks. p.12
4. Where it is, it
is more certainly
to be supplied by
Advocates.
11*
5. And by Appeal. p.12.
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11*
Three Judges in the
same court are
1,00 –
In three successive
Courts each exerts
his whole force.
14
To give a multitude
the maximum
of intelligence they
should preside by
turns. p.14.
15
IV. Promptitude
Plurality is adverse
to this end by
1. Necessity of giving
opinions Servatim p.15
16
2. Altercations &
quarrels – whence
fresh incidents &
fresh altercations &c. p.15
17.
3. Adjournments for
conciliation. p.16
7. A single Judge
has but one opinion
to give
8. He has nobody
to dispute & quarrel with
9. Nobody whose
opinion is obliged
to wait for
10. Nobody whose
account repeal he is to
wait for of former & to study in order to
make himself master of transactions in the
same cause the preceding train.
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17(a)
English practice
Adjournments for
concilitation. p.17.
Whence
1. Delay.
2. In case of false
unanimity, judicial
swindling.
18
Appeal the proper
remedy against
non-rectitude of
decision. p.19
The delay & expence
occasioned by multiplicity
is unfavourable
to rectitude
of decision by discouraging
Appeal. p.19
19
Plurality is only
of use in as far
as it induces a
degree of publicity. p.21
Thence in plurality publicity
with unity ought to be the dependence.
20
English practice
1. Chancery. p.23
2. Commons
3. Lords
4. Scotch Judges
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21
Reasons for multiplicity
of legislators
extend not to
Judges. p.25
Legislation requires
1. Inventive genius.
2. Eloquence.
3. Local intelligence
22
4. Legislators if
few would be liable
to be corrupted
1. by the Crown
2. by individuals.
p.25
25 23
Few deputies would
require large districts - whence
1. Embarassment
2. Non-importance
& thence d neglect
of Electors' votes
3. Inordinate importance
of a seat –
hence
of the Deputies &
conflicts for power
as of so many Kings.
24
Data to be secured
Despotism & negative
in the laws on
the part of the highest
Court of Justice.
Necessary security
against it, its
dependence on the
legislature. p.26
25
Judges may be
multiplied with less
inconvenience in
Courts of Appeal. p.27
1. Expence less
2. Delay less
3. Demand for intelligence greater
4-5-6 But Probity intelligence
& responsibility remain
as much diminished as in the other case.
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Identifier: | JB/051/055/002 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 51.
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1-16, 1-10, 12, 13, 11, 11*, 14-17, 17a, 18-25 |
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051 |
evidence; procedure code |
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055 |
judges number contents |
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002 |
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marginal summary sheet |
4 |
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recto |
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jeremy bentham |
[[watermarks::l munn [britannia with shield motif]]] |
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benjamin constant |
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[[notes_public::"omit other side" [note in bentham's hand]]] |
16220 |
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