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12 Apr. 1803
Evidence
From the view thus taken of the several classes of lights
or grounds of decision, which it may be the effect of an
act of precipitation to exclude, as will soon be manifest enough it is evident how far this kind
of inconvenience is from being in respect of its effects what at first glance it might be thought to be the exact
counterpart and opposite of unnecessary delay. By unnecessary delay the three negative
inconveniences of the first order – non-application of punishment
where due, non-application of satisfaction where due
and non-collation of rights where due are produced to a
certainty, and continued while it lasts: while but in virtue by the operation
of the same cause a chance more or less considerable of the
final ultimate and perpetual existence of those same inconveniences
is moreover produced according to the nature of the case, penal or non-penal,
is produced: and not only of those negative inconveniences,
of which the plaintiff in the cause is the victim but of their respectively opposite positive ones – application of
punishment where not due, application of satisfaction where not
due and thence of the burthen attached to the obligation of administering
it, and collation of rights where not due – thence imposition
of the mass of burthensome obligations by the imposition of which those rights
are conferred, the burthen of which falls upon the defendant.
In the case of precipitation To precipitation on the other hand, there is stands
attached, it is true a chance more or less considerable of the existence of all those
several six inconveniences of the first order in the several cases
to which they apply, and to the prejudice of the cause of the
plaintiff or that of the defendant, as it may happen. A chance, yes: But it
has not in any case any one of those inconveniences for its
certain consequence. If the decision equivocally A Judge gives
at the very first moment, at the very first word spoken or exhibited to
him, the very same decision which he would have given, had he
given the fairest and fullest hearing after the of the to both parties at the
end of all such steps as either party thought fit to take. The case
is everywhere a most conceivable one, and being the most simple one, is cnceivable indeed, will much
more
Identifier: | JB/058/133/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 58.
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