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JB/063/115/002

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Why INTENTION is regarded?

It is an aphorism as frequent in the familiarity of ordinary conversation as in the
-nity of legal Argument; that "Where there is no intention there can be no Crime
and the consequence is looked upon as altogether a necessary one : that therefore there ought
be no punishment.

It is ordinar This being met with in the Mouths of all men, is ordinarily looked upon
as standing at that point of self-evidence beyond which no arguments can reach: all
men accustom themselves to look upon it as a maxim of which tho' unquestionably
true, no reason can be given, and of which therefore none ought to be required.

But upon a more critical examination it will appear, that the consequences
in many cases are is not just; and that where it is a very clear reason can be
given for it upon the principle of general utility.

That the consequence is often not just is owing to an all ambiguously involved in
the antecedent [position]: an ambiguity arising from the elliptical form of the
expression.

This ambiguity is often still further
experienced by the guiltiest "criminal"
sometimes prefixed to the word
"intention" tho' that epithet by the
printed term it gives the sentence
to add to it's perspicuity.

As this is a maxim of great importance, the influence of it extending over the whole
System of Penal Law, the enquiry tho' somewhat intricate may well deserve a particular attention it will be worthy of a particular adjective.
Iteration to do what? the answer to this question will at once clear up the ambiguity
of the maxim and mark out the boundaries of its propriety distinguish what is just and what is false in the consequence
that is drawn derived from it.

Can a man, say they, be guilty without
criminal intention?

Now the intention here implied must be either must mean nothing but <add>can refer itself but to some one or more of those things:</add> 1st simply to do the act in
question, which as the case stands, happens to be minimal or such as the Law appears mischievous
2dly To do the act as criminal is forbidden by the positive laws of the state
or 3dly to do the act as expected wrong on whatever account.

In more familiar language — A man who eventually committs does an action
forbidden by the Law either 1st does it without intending to do it: or secondly
intending to do it, does it without thinking it forbidden by the Law: or lastly
intending to do it and knowing it to be forbidden by the Law, he thinks it right,
on some other account and does it notwithstanding.



Identifier: | JB/063/115/002
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 63.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

063

Main Headings

law in general

Folio number

115

Info in main headings field

book i offences in general exemptions intention why & how far regarded

Image

002

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

2

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

/ d1

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

[[watermarks::[gr with crown motif] [britannia with shield motif]]]

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

20304

Box Contents

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