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Introduction
The great advantage of the doctrine of
Expectation is that it presents all along
a certain matter fact, on which the opinion pronounced
in any instance that such a thing is right or
wrong, is equity or is not equity, is founded.
Whereas the current maxims that are in used the way of
being to be appealed to for the decision of the several
questions of distributive Jurisprudence, either
professedly rest the matter upon a bare opinion,
of which no reason further than the universality
of it is pretended to be given, or if they profess
to give
& of balance of Utilities
Now the matter
of fact is no other
than thi
s viz. the state of
sensations upon the commission of an act
of the persons within
the circle of it's influence:
viz. of emotions.....
partly present, partly
future in certainty partly future in
contingency, or
all together at their present value
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A maxim to be just & intelligible intelligible must openly The weights that are to be put <add>vested in
refer to, & to be just must be founded in or at
least justifiable by, a balance of utilities, i:e: or in other words by a computation of happiness
& unhappiness.</p>
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Equity are Grains of Happiness, & Unhappiness.
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These maxims are only do no more than announce that
one hal the Ballance inclines [in the several cases to which
they relate]+ +according to the opinion of him who delivers them which they describe to this or the other side. they do not
announce.
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And, content, with me, to abandon themselves
[without reserve] wholly & solely to the guidance
of this principle.
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The science of Jurisprudence (and the same may be said
of Morality) treated upon this plan, is as strictly and
properly a science of experiment, as any branch of
Natural Philosophy: with only this difference (must
it must be confessed to it's disadvantage) that whereas in
Natural Philosophy the phenomenon in which the
are founded+ + and in the examination of which under a general aspect they consist are at any time created for the satisfaction submitted to the
expectation of the enquirers, & of those to any number at once, + v.II
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To tell answer me they think this because they think that, is
no more than to tell me, they think so because
they think so. It is opinion still that is the only
reason given me: but opinion is what I am not satisfied with: If I were, I had what it I wanted already,
& had no occasion to put the question.
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In asking a further reason for the universal opinion
in question, I have already declared myself not
to be satisfied with bare opinion, [how universal soever]
for that I had already when I asked.
the nature which should in this second instant determined my acquiescence, is subsisted in full force already in the first.
INTROD. Utility rests on Fact—Expectation a fact & others 3.
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It is manifest, that if a of maxims become so
reason, that reason must ultimate
truth cannot rest stand upon an eternal circle of opinions
Here It is manifest that in a series of maxims
connected that one of them shall be the reason
of the other, the last reason+ +i:e: that which is itself of such a nature, that no reason can be given or [reasonably] required, but is itself free of the reason of all the rest, must always be
fact. For a one mattter of opinion Take the If a reason be
demanded of sought for an opinion To him who demands the
reason for any opinion, recognized to be <add>for a general one</add> it is no answer to give
him another opinion: for if he were disposed to
rest the matter upon opinion he might as well have
taken up with the first of them at once.
One opinion can never be the sufficient reason
of another.
verifiable by evidence
An opinion is simply what a person thinks.+ + upon a given subject
a general opinion is what most persons think:+ + upon that subject
an universal opinion+ + happening if to such a thing to exist) or (supposing there is such a thing in the world as an universal opinion upon any question)
To what is it owing?
is what all persons think.
Suppose I hear a certain opinion any opinion no matter what given for universal:
I ask the reason of it. If all persons
think so, say I, why is it that they think?
what makes them, what causes them to think?
It is plain that, to give me another such universal opinion can
be no+ + final answer to my question: nor can he who gives
me such an answer have any reason to expect I
should be satisfied with it. the answer is, people
think this, because they think that: but why do
they think that? it is plain I have that the
which determined me to ask a reason for the 1st opinion,
must [shall subsist &] determine me to ask that one
for the 2d opinion.
What quality is that in the subject, which being present existing that opinion to like place, & which upon the nonexistence of which it appears that that opinion would not obtain?
That which my question all along points to, is some
what it supposes, is, that those such a fact, there is, & according to what it demands,
is, what is it?
But it will be said, is there+ + it is true, that there is then in every case such
a fact? is my question such,|| || such as in... can be that in every case
it can be satisfied? can the reason that, I can
be always given? I say, it can.+ + Give the proof of this on another Sheet—from these topics. 1st Supposing the opinions even only general this cannot be the effect of hazard
If I have proved this, then
I say further that2 It must be the effect of a of the different manner in which the happiness of persons concerned is effected in the 2 cases - For, This a consideration that is , & behaves given the opinion in any of such a nature
Corollary.
If this theory by true it will serve
as a striking instance example to prove, that important & fact in history & then be man that not
only do single persons, but in a manner all
mankind, may be determined & that for during a continuation many
ages by considerations of which they are not
conscious:
4. There is nothing for no other assignable difference in the two cases
than such a difference.
On [BK. II] opinion. One opin. no reason for another.
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