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A Pleasure that is the ultimate object of the act of Government
that produces it is not properly reward: nor is
it in this score marked by any appropriated denomination.
It is the fruit (of that government) result and fruit of the operations of that power which superintends
the actions general (assemblage) of actions of man in general, but it is not
the reward of any one action in particular.

Pain is never never is nor from the nature of mankind
can it ever be, the ultimate object of any act not even of any vindictive sort act of
government. But it may be, and indeed is in
all cases where Government exerts itself must be
is a greater or less degree the a collateral effect of
an act directed to another end. The Government
unless it obliges, (that is) unless it constrains men to
do something, or, as the case is restrains them from
doing it, does nothing. Now to be obliged to do
what one has a mind not to do, or not to do what
one has a mind to do, is to suffer pain. And to oblige with unless by
a man has a mind not to do a thing, to oblige him not to
do it, or, unless he has a mind to do it, to oblige him not
to do it is to do nothing. (Nothing is gained) by the obligation. Pain Being thus
always one effect, or at least liable to be one effect, of
an act of Government, it may however be produced
either as purposely as well as knowingly, or whether
knowingly or not, not purposely. When purposely, it is
stiled as we have observed, by the name of Punishment.
When not purposely, it is not distinguished by any peculiar

– Act of punishment –
Act of compelling compensation – Act of self-preservation – Act of restraint
Punishment therefore in this sense of the word being a species of
pain cannot for of itself be compared with any thing which is not either a species of
pain or of something of which pain is a species. It is for this reason, that it
cannot properly be compared with any of the following entities to wit all which it is yet
enough to be confounded. But an act of punishment may be compared with an act of &c.

Identifier: | JB/159/263/004
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 159.


Marginal Summary Numbering



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Folio number


Info in main headings field

crit. jur. crim




punishment - talio - where inapplicable / stare decisis


text sheet

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Page Numbering

d101 / d102 / d103 / d104


jeremy bentham


[[watermarks::[gr with crown] propatria [britannia motif]]]


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Box Contents

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