★ Keep up to date with the latest news - subscribe to the Transcribe Bentham newsletter; Find a new page to transcribe in our list of Untranscribed Manuscripts
1823. April 16
Constitut. Code
4. Course here pursued Means here employed for surmounting it
4. Course here to be taken in the for the of all those
obstacles.
To the devising of any well grounded and rational
course for the surmounting of the obstacles the constant preference of the universal to every narrow interest opposed to good government
by universal self-preference in the breasts of the functionaries of
government constituted guardians of the universal
interest the first step was the taking a new observation recognizing of the
existence and shape of that same universal private particular and sinister
interest. This problem theory being accomplished, correspondent
and accordant practice follow becomes as a matter of course.
Hence the leading with Minimize confidence: for in those into the compass of those
two words may be condensed the all-directing and leading
rule. Such then is the advice which the framers
of this Constitution have not been backward in giving to
all who who are whom it finds disposed to accept it. Confine
within the strictest limits of necessity whatsoever confidence
you feel disposed may be inclined it repose either in us or in any
some of those whom it is possible for us to have for our
successors.
At the same time, here as in a watch
this this main spring require another to antagonize with
it. Of every all constituents to it at the same time the error
from no delegate to withhold any of that power which may
eventually be necessary to the maximization of the service
looked for at their hands. While confidence is minimized
let no power be starved. For security against breach
of trust the sole apt remedy is – on the part of trustees not impotence but
constant responsibility, and as towards those creators the authors of this political being
on every occasion and at all times and on every occasion the strictest and most absolute dependence. In the first
place with powers not no otherwise limited on the part of the supreme legislature
the most absolute dependence on the supreme constitution
and thus in a choice reading due from the supreme legislature
down to the lowest functionary, of each trade through the medium of the such
several increasing texts in
a state of equally perfect
dependence on the supreme legislature, and thus and by those means in the supreme Constitution. Divorce of power beyond absolutely necessity not in any part of that choice. If the supreme Constitution were in a single hand in the hands of a single person⊞1
were in the hands of a Monarch, no
objection would there be on his part
to of this choice of dependence
none on the part of any of those who
that the many may depe be dependent
on them, are well content to be
dependent on that one. Let it be⊞2
⊞2 seen it will be seen whether there is less reason for content
when the few are thus dependant
to the strength of this choice⊞3
⊞3 the all, is as
near to the being th
all as the unchangeable
condition of human
nature will allow
them to be.
Identifier: | JB/036/228/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 36.
|
|||
---|---|---|---|
1823-04-16 |
1-2 |
||
036 |
constitutional code |
||
228 |
constitut. code |
||
001 |
|||
text sheet |
1 |
||
recto |
d9 / e1 |
||
jeremy bentham |
j whatman turkey mill 1822 |
||
jonathan blenman |
|||
1822 |
|||
11152 |
|||