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1823. March 1
Greece. J.B.s Observations on particular Articles
Between True it is, that where, between one functionary or set of functionaries and
another, divesting sharing between them a power which is independent of
When in the institution of the government a
place a functionary or set of functionaries has power has place whose that of the people, is shared out,
power is independent of the people, in this state of things that of the people a case there is, a case there is in which
a division among ruling functionaries so situated a division
of power will in in which such division, in so far as it has place, have has a
tendency to be productive of effects beneficial to the
interest in of the people.⊞1 ⊞1 This is – where the
power so divided is
the supreme power in
the State, and the say
mode of division such
the power of the legislative
in the highest grade,
and the mode of
division such, that
no valid act can
be performed by
the one of those authorities without the concurrence
of the other.
In this case the power
is fractionaliz fractionized:
the whole power
is the integer, and
each of them has a
fraction fractional part of it. Thus
in the English Government
the whole of this power
is divided into three
fractions: to the King belongs
one, to the House
of Lords another, to the House
of Commons another:
in the case of each of
those two Houses, the
fraction is moreover further fractionized:
to each Member
belongs a fraction of that
of the House he sits in:
which fraction is thus
a sub-fraction of the
whole.
In which case and by belonging ?
Answer – in the case In case of that which is so natural between In a case of this sort, this same good tendency what does it depend
the sharers those among whom the power is divided upon? may be seen It depends upon that those disagreements and those
and shared, and by means of opposite to consist which in such a case are so the sort of natural,
less explicit, which the contending parties will find themselves and have been so universally exemplified. Every such contest
of to the good opinion having for its subject matter the obedience of the people, each party
has at times found itself under a necessity more or less urgent of courting
the good will of the part greatest happiness of the people people. The consequence has been that
when between the parties so contending a cessation of hostility and a compromise in some shape or other has been had place; they have⊞2 ⊞2 they both of them
found themselves under
the necessity of
concurring in the establishment
of some arrangement by from
which from which the interest
and condition of the people
has received some more or
less beneficial service.
Hence it was Under the sense of this necessity it was
that on the occasion of their contes with the Monarch King John the
great Aristocrats members of the great Aristocratical bodyof the time the Barons in terminating the termination
they put to that contract contest by the Charter which they exacted succeeded in exacting from him
let in the freeman admitted the great body of the freemen freemen
into a some the benefit of some portion of the security, such as it was, which it
professed to establish. But, that what seems probable, is –
that the portion of the population to which this security
was on that occasion extended, formed but in those days by far the population smallest portion of
the whole.
Thus again on the occasion of that conflict which
in the year 1688 substituted which substituted one run of Monarchs to another
whos whom the Aristocracy of the country gave obtained for itself, not only security against
arbitrary power in the hands of the Monarch, but the confirmation of a share co-ordinate
with his own in the power belonging to the legislative and judicial departments,
they could not altogether avoid letting in admitting the great
body of the people to the benefit of a some share of the security obtained
for themselves in respect of person and property. and For
in giving that of their own share they gave themselves that security which was afforded by
and quantities the Bill of Rights. And the undisturbed possession of theirs till those disputed and precarious shares
in the sovereignty supreme power as above. As to the people they their fraction knew⊞3 ⊞3 better than to give to them any such security: in place of it they what they gave them was – that of vague, and non-obligatory and ineffective
generalities called the Bill of Rights. From men so situated how could anything better have reasonably been expected? By a genuine
by a genuine representation of the people, the power interest
of the people would have been got such a share of the supreme powers, wherever exercised and their interest and happiness
advanced and that of those their rulers immediately have been diminished, or used
ultimately per adventure abolished.
The system sham representation
as if it had been the
peoples only safeguard,
ws therefore most carefully, and
and compleatly entirely preserved,
and in all its plenitudes,
preserved.
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Identifier: | JB/106/344/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 106.
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1823-03-01 |
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106 |
constitutional code |
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344 |
greece jb observations on particular articles |
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text sheet |
1 |
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recto |
c2 / e14 / f18 |
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jeremy bentham |
j whatman 1821 |
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admiral pavel chichagov |
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1821 |
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34932 |
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