JB/106/346/001

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1823. March 1
Greece

Any division which it might be proposed to make of
the supreme power in the State, has it or has it not a
tendency to lodge any part of it that same power in the hands of the great
body of the people? If so has not, such such tendency
in what way is it possible that to the people by that same body great body any
benefit should be reaped from it? If it has any such
tendency yes, suppose such tendency repined into act; and the consequence is – a
portion of the power in consequence – it accordingly lodged in the hands of the
people: in of them in which can but no more than a portion, becomes lodged in the hands of the people. But from this portion be it ever so considerable, how is it possible than any benefit can be derived reaped by them greater than or even so great as that which would be reaped by them from the whole? In a word how can a chance of a part be equal in value to the possession of the whole? Yet on this chance of a part, and it has been seen how feeble an one, depends the utmost benefit, which can ever have been supposed derivable by them from the any division made of the supreme power in question, they by the supposition not having any share in it.
be productive of any benefit to the people equal to the
which would be the result of an arrangement
the whole of the power given in their hands?

Suppose now Take now the converse of the above case. Suppose
the whole of the supreme power to be already
in the hands of the people – and then say how any benefit show let it be seen
whether any benefit could be produced to them by a any scheme of
division by which a part this or that portion of it more or less considerable
were lodged in any other hands. Take for example
the Anglo-American United States. In that seat of good
government and consequent felicity, the whole of the supreme
power is in the hands of the people: the supreme Constitutive
in the hands of the greatest number: the Supreme Operative,
supreme Legislative and Executive included, in the hands of agents of theirs, placed by them unimmediately
or immediately some in an im immediate others in an unimmediate way called, sooner or later, all displaceable,
and those who have most power respectively displaced by them. Add now a King, with
a rite upon every act of the legislative Assembly body, and the
power of placing and displacing all subordinate functionaries
belonging to the Executive department. Here then would be
a division of power: a division, so far as it went, agreeing
with that which has place in England. To the people
in question what would be the benefit of it? By the most amount
scrutiny could any the smallest possible particle of benefit be found
derivable from it?

Identifier: | JB/106/346/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 106.
Date_1	1823-03-01	Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	106	Main Headings	constitutional code
Folio number	346	Info in main headings field	greece
Image	001	Titles
Category	text sheet	Number of Pages	1
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering	c4 / e16 / f20
Penner	jeremy bentham	Watermarks
Marginals		Paper Producer
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year
Notes public		ID Number	34934
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